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The question of lender liability is now a favorite subject in the law.1 In the past
few years, numerous lender liability theories have emerged on a case-by-case basis. 2
Among the liability theories that have developed in this ad hoc fashion, the doctrine
of good faith and fair dealing plays relatively little role.3 The doctrine of good faith
and fair dealing traditionally has not been relied upon by courts as a primary theory
of lender liability; rather, it is considered as a possible basis of civil liability in
connection with other more established liability theories. Because of its inherent
flexibility and the resulting potential for expansion, the doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing may, however, gain significance in commercial lending transactions in the
years to come.
Conceptually, the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing is on the borderline
between contract law and tort law.4 As one prominent commentator has observed, the
distinction between contract and tort liability as between contracting parties has
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become increasingly difficult to make.- An unprincipled expansion of the doctrine of
good faith and fair dealing will confuse rather than clarify that distinction.
This Article discusses selected court decisions imposing civil liability for breach
of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing and analyzes the question of to what
extent, if any, the holdings of these cases may affect commercial lending transac-
tions. Although the principles of contract and tort causes of action for breach of the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing are generally well settled today, it is often
difficult in lender liability cases to determine the type of action that is brought.6 The
difficulties result from the possibility that acts of a party may breach duties in either
tort or contract alone or simultaneously in both. 7 The problem is aggravated by the
tendency of courts in lender liability cases to use the terms "covenant of good faith"
and "duty of good faith" interchangeably. This practice explains, at least in part, the
confusion surrounding a lender's liability to its borrower for breach of the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing. Throughout this Article, the term "covenant" of good
faith and fair dealing will refer to the express or implied contractual obligation of
good faith and fair dealing, whereas the term "duty" of good faith and fair dealing
will be used to refer to the non-contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing
which is imposed by law irrespective of the existence of a contractual relationship.
The first Part of this Article explores the various contractual bases of lender
liability under the good faith doctrine. The application and limitations of lender
liability under the tort law duty of good faith and fair dealing are presented in the
second Part. In this context, an attempt is made to articulate operational standards that
distinguish good faith and fair dealing from bad faith and unfair dealing in
commercial lending transactions. In the third Part, attention is drawn to the legal,
economical, and social expedience of the emerging theories of lender liability for
breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Throughout, this Article
emphasizes the theoretical aspects as well as the practical implications of the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in commercial lending transactions.
I. COVENANT
The contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing in all commercial
lending transactions may arise in one of two forms. The obligation may be expressly
stipulated by the parties, or it may be implied in the contract.
A. Express Covenant
Commercial lending transactions typically are based upon written contracts that
are carefully drafted by legal counsel. These contracts very often contain a covenant
that expressly subjects the parties to an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the
performance or enforcement of the contract. The express covenant of good faith and
5. W. PROSSER & W. KErON, LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 655 (5th ed. 1984).
6. See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 617 (rex. 1986).
7. Id. at 618 (suggesting that the "nature of the injury" most often determines which duty or duties are breached).
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fair dealing, when breached, gives rise to an action in contract and enables recovery
for compensatory damages.
The effect of the express covenant of good faith and fair dealing in commercial
lending transactions is to require that, in their performance or enforcement of the
transaction, the parties show good faith in the carrying out of what is expressed in the
contract or hoped for, but not expressly regulated, by the parties. The covenant of
good faith requires the cooperation of one party to the lending agreement where it is
necessary in order that the other party might secure the expected benefits of the
bargain. 8 In the performance of a commercial lending transaction or the enforcement
of a right arising out of a loan agreement, a party who evades "the spirit of the
agreement" and so denies the other the benefit of the bargain commits a breach even
if the evasive conduct is within the letter of the agreement. 9
The expansive nature of the good faith covenant may lead to results which would
have been considered ludicrous in an earlier time. Consider, for example, the terms
of a loan agreement under which a lender is required to advance funds to its borrower
so long as the borrower maintains certain financial ratios. The language of the loan
agreement is clear, and the standard of performance is objective. If a borrower does
not satisfy the ratios and thereafter files suit against the lender as a result of the
lender's refusal to advance funds, until recently most courts would have had no
problem holding in favor of the lender. Yet, the modern trend, at least in some
jurisdictions, is to reject such "time honored formalities." Under a broad interpre-
tation of the good faith covenant, a lender must act within the spirit of the agreement,
notwithstanding the express terms of the agreement itself. Thus, for instance, a lender
may be required to advance money at a time when, under the terms of the written
agreement with its borrower, it is technically not required to do so.
B. Implied Covenant
In the absence of an express covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the question
arises whether an implied contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing exists
in commercial lending transactions.
1. Uniform Commercial Code
The answer to this question is relatively simple with respect to transactions that
are subject to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or Code). Section 1-203 of the
U.C.C. states in unambiguous terms that "[elvery contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." 10 The
Uniform Commercial Code defines "good faith" in section 1-201(19) as "honesty in
fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 1 Thus, contracts within the Code are,
8. See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. Ca. L. REv. 666, 672 (1963).
9. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
54 VA. L. REv. 195, 234 (1968).
10. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
11. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977).
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as a matter of statutory law, subject to an implied contractual obligation of good faith
in their performance or enforcement. The premise of good faith within the meaning
of section 1-203 of the U.C.C. is that each party to a Code contract will make efforts,
honest in fact, to meet the terms and, more importantly, the spirit of the performance
and enforcement obligations where the agreement is silent.12
Reliance, direct or indirect, on the good faith provisions of the U.C.C. must be
made with care and with an eye toward the operational purpose of each article. For
example, Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies directly only to contracts for the sale of
goods or future goods.' 3 Typical commercial lending transactions such as loans are
not contracts for the sale of goods; they are, therefore, not within the ambit of the
good faith provisions of Article 2 of the Code. Section 1-208 opens the door,
however, for a great number of loan agreements to fall within the Code's good faith
provisions. As applied to commercial lending transactions, section 1-208 in effect
states that where a lender has the power to "accelerate payment or performance or
require collateral or additional collateral 'at will' or 'when he deems himself insecure'
... he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect
of payment or performance is impaired." 1 4 Accordingly, acceleration of a debt
triggers the good faith provisions of the Code.
Section 1-208 of the U.C.C., by its very terms, applies to the acceleration of a
debt not yet due. Accelerations of debts not yet due may take 'several forms. Thus,
for example, a lender must not declare a promissory note due unless it believes in
good faith that the prospect of payment on the note is impaired. A setoff by the lender
against the borrower's deposits with the lender may amount to an impermissible
acceleration if there is no evidence that the debtor is insolvent, 15 Similarly, a demand
for additional collateral or the premature proceeding against the collateral may
constitute an acceleration in violation of section 1-208. As previously stated, the term
"good faith" is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned."1 6 This definition establishes a standard of good
faith conduct that is less stringent than commercial reasonableness and fair dealing,
which Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires of merchants.17 The
"honesty in fact" standard would also seem to be more subjective than the
commercial reasonableness and fair dealing standard.' 8 In terms of insecurity, a
lender acts in good faith if it acts on what it honestly believes, whether or not that
12. Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank and Trust Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
13. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1977). For an analysis of the applicability of the good faith provisions of the U.C.C. to
commercial lending transactions, see Ebke, Verhaltenspflichten der Kreditinstitute gegenueber sanierungsbeduerftigen
Kunden nach US-amerikanischem Recht, 33 REcH-r oER INTERNATIONALEN wIRTscHAFr 329, 332 (1987).
14. U.C.C. § 1-208 (1977). The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the borrower. Id.
15. See Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 530.
16. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977).
17. See U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1977). For a detailed discussion of the development of the standard of "commercial
reasonableness and fair dealing," see Winship, Jurisprudence and the Uniform Commercial Code: A "Commote," 31
Sw. L.J. 843, 856 (1977).
18. Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 533 (citing various sources). Accord Bahls, supra note 2, at 247 (suggesting that "[t]he
honesty in fact standard is a subjective standard.. ."). But see Karner v. Willis, 238 Kan. 246, 250, 710 P.2d 21, 24
(1985) (Herd, J., dissenting).
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belief is actual. 19 Thus, under sections 1-208 and 1-201(19), it is sufficient that the
lender honestly believes that the payment of the debt is impaired. To act with honesty
in fact is to act without arbitrary purpose. That is to say that the belief of insecurity
which prompts the acceleration may not be bereft of rational basis nor amount to an
open abuse of that discretionary power.
Considerable confusion exists as to whether a lender's failure to act in good faith
in cases governed by the Uniform Commercial Code constitutes a breach of contract
resulting in contract damages or an independent tort resulting in tort damages and
possibly punitive damages. The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
lender's breach of the implied covenant of good faith under the Uniform Commercial
Code gives rise to a cause of action which sounds in contract. 20 The Supreme Court
of Montana, by contrast, found that punitive damages may be awarded when the duty
of good faith exists as a matter of law rather than as part of the contract itself.21
Consequently, the court awarded punitive damages although the loan agreement
expressly precluded punitive damages. The court's holding is subject to substantial
criticism because section 1-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code expressly prohibits
the imposition of any punitive remedy. 22 In light of section 1-106, it would seem to
be fair to conclude that where the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation
of good faith and fair dealing on the parties to a contract or agreement within the
ambit of the Code, the breach of that obligation should give rise to contract damages
only.
2. Analogy
Even where the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply directly, courts have
had little theoretical difficulty imposing upon lenders an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. In some cases, the Uniform Commercial Code has been cited in support
of the proposition that lenders have an obligation to perform or enforce the loan
agreement in good faith. Thus, for example, in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,23 the
Sixth Circuit relied, in part, upon section 2-309 of the Code to hold a lender liable
for failing to notify its borrower prior to a refusal to lend.24 While it is true that
section 2-309 requires a party who intends to terminate a contract to give the other
party reasonable notice of its intent, the court failed to mention that Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code did not apply directly to the loan agreement in question.
Consequently, the court did not discuss the intriguing question of whether the good
faith provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code can be applied to loan agreements
19. Rigby, 713 S.W.2d at 533.
20. See, e.g., International Bank, N.A. v. Morales, 736 S.W.2d 622, 624 (ex. 1987); Texas Nat'l Bank v.
Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 ('ex. 1986) (citing two other eases).
21. First Nat'l Bank v. Twombly, 213 Mont. 66, 73, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (1984).
22. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 797 n.134.
23. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985). The case is discussed in Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co. (757 F.2d 752):
Discretionary Financing and the Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 539 (1987). See also Tyler, supra note
2, at 416-19; Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 796-97.
24. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 759-60.
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by means of analogy.25 One would hope that those courts that are willing to apply the
good faith provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to loan agreements by means
of analogy see themselves bound by section 1-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
according to which remedies under the Code are strictly compensatory in nature.
3. Common Law
Outside the Uniform Commercial Code, the trend in modern American contract
law is clearly toward a broader application of the doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing. Many American jurisdictions now recognize, as a matter of common law, an
implied obligation to perform or enforce a contract in good faith.26 Thus, even in the
absence of an express covenant of good faith and fair dealing, any conduct of any
party in violation of the implied obligation may result in liability for damages caused
by the conduct. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts reflects this view. According
to section 205 of the Restatement, "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.' '27 The
Restatement even provides some examples of conduct constituting bad faith,
including "evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off,
willing rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance."-28
A closer look at the case law suggests, however, that in commercial lending
cases, the courts of a number of states have declined, outside the Uniform
Commercial Code, to hold that every contract contains an implied obligation of good
faith and fair dealing. Thus, for example, the Texas Supreme Court, in the case of
English v. Fischer,2 9 was unwilling to find an actionable covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in all transactions based upon contract. 30 The court criticized the good
faith doctrine as contrary to the adversarial nature of the legal system. For, according
to the court, the good faith theory permits juries to decide cases based upon what
might seem "fair and in good faith," rather than upon settled rules of law. 31 It is at
least arguable, however, that the language of the court in English is overly broad. The
terms of the contract in question expressly authorized the conduct complained of by
the party advancing the good faith theory. 32 Narrowly read, the case stands for the
simple proposition that, under Texas law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing cannot be relied upon to contradict the express, negotiated terms of a
25. See Ebke, supra note 13, at 332.
26. For a catalogue of cases, see Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
94 HAiv. L. Ray. 369, 404 (1980). See also Seman v. First State Bank, 394 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
27. RESTATEMENTr (SEcoN ) oF CoNTRAcrs § 205 (1981).
28. Id. § 205 comment d.
29. 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983). For a detailed discussion of English, see Ailts, supra note 4, at 1311-17.
30. English, 660 S.W.2d at 522.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 522-23. Although the identity of the drafters of the contract in English is not apparent from the reported
decision, it is significant that one party to the contract was an attorney and the other party was the ex-wife of an attorney.
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contract.33 This limited interpretation of the case is consistent with subsequent
decisions citing but not overruling English.34
Whether expressed in a written loan agreement or implied as a matter of law, the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing serves as a standard of performance in
contractual undertakings. In some jurisdictions the application of the covenant may
be limited to those circumstances not otherwise agreed upon by the parties. Other
jurisdictions may rule that the covenant confers a judicial license upon the courts to
review the relative bargaining positions of the parties and the express terms of the
agreement. The real question behind the potentially different views would seem to be
the question of how much freedom of contract the legal system is willing to accept
in commercial lending transactions. Plaintiffs and defendants should realize that
whether or not a court will recognize a common law obligation of good faith and fair
dealing in a commercial lending transaction will depend almost entirely upon whether
the court is willing to accept the basic notion of freedom of contract3s or views its role
as that of a social engineer who can reallocate the bargaining power of the parties with
hindsight, thereby furthering its own view of justice.3 6
II. DUTrr
Regardless of its application within any particular jurisdiction, the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing is overshadowed by the prospect for enhanced damage
awards in tort for breach of the good faith duty. Recently, some courts, including the
Texas Supreme Court, have held that, in certain cases, an action may lie in tort for
breach of the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. Judicial recognition
of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in contractual relationships results
from the search by some courts for a principled basis on which to award punitive
damages for breach of contract. 37 It is settled today that exemplary damages are not
an appropriate remedy for breach of an express or an implied covenant in contract. 38
As a general rule, contractual damages should be measured by the benefit expected
to be obtained by the non-breaching party. It is well established, however, that
punitive damages may be awarded for breach of a duty in tort.39 Punitive damages
33. Id. at 522. The concurring opinion lists cases in which, contrary to the majority opinion, Texas courts have
recognized an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in contractual relationships. See id. at 524.
34. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 678 S.W.2d 944, 947 (rex. 1984) ("The agreement made
by the parties and embodied in the contract itself cannot be varied by an implied good-faith-and-fair-dealing covenant.").
35. The reference to the principle of freedom of contract, of course, is not meant to suggest that lenders are entirely
free to impose upon borrowers their own terms in loan agreements regardless of reasonableness.
36. See Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 796 n.123.
37. See generally Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 377 (1986).
38. RSrATENEiNr (SEco.o) oF CoeTR.crs § 355 (1981). See also Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704
S.W.2d 742, 745 (rex. 1986); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981); Texas Nat'l Bank v.
Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901, 903 (rex. 1986).
39. REsrATEMuNT (SeoD) OFToRTS § 908 (1979). See also International Bank, N.A. v. Morales, 736 S.W.2d 622,
624 (rex. 1987) (stressing the significance of "a finding of an independent tort with accompanying actual damages").
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provide additional recovery to the victim and arguably deter similar tortious conduct
in the future. 40
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing is the common element linking
contract law covenants and tort law duties. At inception, the relationship between
borrower and lender is inherently contractual in nature. From the contract, a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing may be implied, at least in some jurisdictions, that
neither party will "do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement.' '41 While the contract is executory as to one or both of the
parties, special circumstances may arise which operate to transform the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing into a duty of good faith and fair dealing, the breach of
which may support an award of exemplary damages.42
A. Special Circumstances and Relationships
As a catalyst causing the transformation from contract to tort, special circum-
stances develop through the relationship between the parties and their conduct toward
one another. Courts have almost uniformly required the existence of special
circumstances as a basis for remedies in tort for breach of the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing. Recognition of special circumstances has been particularly prevalent
in insurance 43 and employment44 contract cases. In these cases, courts have used the
duty of good faith and fair dealing to equalize the otherwise unequal bargaining
power of the parties to such contracts.
The cause of action for breach of the good faith duty in employment and
insurance cases has gained relatively widespread acceptance in recent years. Through
those cases, attorneys and judges have gained an understanding of the applications
and limitations of the cause of action. K Mart Corporation v. Ponsock45 provides a
ready example of this proposition. In this case, the court considered an employee's
40. For a critical analysis of the deterrence argument advanced by proponents of far-reaching civil liabilities of
commercial lenders, see Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 806-13.
41. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958) (discussing implied
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in insurer-insured context).
42. See Tribby v. Northwestern Bank, 704 P.2d 409, 419 (Mont. 1985):
We are not holding that every contract or every statutorily imposed obligation, alone, carries with it an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the breach of which permits recovery in tort. WVe hold only that the
District Court, under these circumstances, did not err when it instructed the jury to consider recovery under tort
principles and, accordingly, punitive damages.
(emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., Aranda v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988); Arnold v. National County Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987).
The Texas Supreme Court in Arnold wrote: "[w]hile this court has declined to impose an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract, we have recognized that a duty of good faith and fair dealing may arise as a result
of a special relationship between the parties governed or created by a contract." Id. at 167.
See also Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 726 P.2d 565 (1986) (tort of bad faith developed as a response to
insurance adjustment abuses in third-party liability cases); Keeton v. Bank of Red Bay, 466 So. 2d 937, 940 n.1 (Ala.
1985) (Supreme Court of Alabama stated that "[a] tort claim for bad faith breach of contract is not a cognizable cause
of action except in the context of a contract of insurance." (citing Sprowl v. Ward, 441 So. 2d 898 (Ala. 1983)));
Gmuenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
44. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) (punitive damages awarded for tortious breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract).
45. Id.
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claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising out of an
employment contract. The court stated that the employee was dependent upon the
employer for a means of livelihood and could therefore expect the employer to act in
good faith with respect to the termination of his employment contract shortly before
his retirement. 46 The court also found that contractual damages were inadequate to
compensate the employee and to deter similar conduct by other employers. 47
Accordingly, the court concluded that the employer breached its duty of good faith
and fair dealing to the employee and awarded punitive damages. 48
The court seems to agree that not every breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing should support tort law remedies. The court stated, in unambiguous
terms, that tort law remedies for breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
are available only in rare and exceptional circumstances. 49 Accordingly, the court
carefully limited its decision by stating that "[t]he special relationships of trust
between this employee and this employer under this contract under this
kind of abusive and arbitrary dismissal cries out for relief and for a remedy beyond
that traditionally flowing from breach of contract.'"50
Whether or not the same rationale applies to commercial lending transactions is
debatable. As applied to loan contracts, some courts may find a tortious breach of the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing when a special relationship exists between
the lender and the borrower, when the lender engages in egregious or outrageous
conduct toward the borrower, and when contractual damages would be inadequate to
compensate the borrower or insufficient to deter the lender and other lenders from
similar actions. In any event, the existence of special circumstances or a special
relationship between a lender and its borrower is essential to a finding of liability
under the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Otherwise, every breach of the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing would constitute a tort leading to exemplary
damages. The term "special relationship" connotes a course of affairs between a
lender and its borrower characterized by trust, confidence, control, and reliance. 51
Commonly, those factors indicate the existence of a fiduciary relationship. For that
reason, traditional fiduciary principles may apply by analogy to determine the
existence of a special relationship between a lender and its borrower. 52
46. Id. at 1372 (citing F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHt OF LABOR 9 (1951)).
47. Id. at 1364.
48. Id. at 1373.
49. Id. at 1370.
50. Id. at 1372 (emphasis added).
51. Id. Concerning the relationship between employer and employee in K Mart, the court stated: "[aifter involving
itself in a relationship of trust and special reliance between itself and its employee and allowing the employee to rely and
depend on continued employment and retirement benefits, the company, to serve its own financial ends, wrongfully and
in bad faith, breached the employment agreement." Id.
See also English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Fex. 1984) (Spears, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion
in English, Justice Spears wrote that the common thread among the cases in which courts have read a duty of good faith
and fair dealing into contractual transactions is a special relationship between the parties to the contract. Id. "That special
relationship," wrote Justice Spears, "either arises from the element of trust necessary to accomplish the goals of the
undertaking, or has been imposed by the courts because of an imbalance of bargaining power." Id.
52. See Carter Equip. Co. v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 681 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Parker v.
Lewis Grocery Co., 246 Miss. 873, 153 So. 2d 261 (1963), and Risk v. Risher, 197 Miss. 155, 19 So. 2d 484 (1944)).
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Whether or not a special relationship exists is, of course, a question of fact to be
decided by the jury.5 3 A jury may find that a contractual relationship has given rise
to a special relationship if the activity of the lender goes beyond its operating on its
own behalf and the activity is for the benefit of both the lender and the borrower.M
Similarly, where lender and debtor "have a common interest and profit from the
activities of the other," a jury may find a special relationshipSS In any case, a jury
may find that a special relationship exists only if the parties repose trust or confidence
in one another and if the lender has the power to control or dominate the debtor.5 6 The
elements of trust, confidence, control, and reliance, it seems, are designed to limit the
liability that may arise from the duty of good faith and fair dealing by narrowly
defining the parameters of the "special relationship."
B. The Commercial Cotton Rule
In light of these requirements, most courts have refused to find a special
relationship between a lender and its borrower sufficient to support recovery for a
tortious breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.5 7 Nevertheless, at least one
court has recognized the existence of a special relationship in a case involving a bank.
It should be noted, however, that the special relationship was found to exist between
a bank and its depositor, not between a bank and its borrower. In Commercial Cotton
Company v. United California Bank,5s a California appellate court stated that the
relationship between a bank and its depositor is characterized by elements of public
interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility.5 9 The court noted the extensive
regulation of the banking industry and the trust reposed in banks by depositors. Based
upon those factors, the court concluded that the relationship between a bank and its
depositor is a special relationship, justifying tort liability for conduct in violation of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 6o
Commercial Cotton cannot be cited, however, in support of the general
proposition that a lender stands in a fiduciary relation to its borrower. Arguably, the
relationship between a bank and its depositor is fiduciary in nature due to the fact that
a depositor entrusts its funds to the banking institution, which is obligated to hold the
funds for the benefit of the depositor. In a lender-borrower situation, by contrast, a
bank entrusts its funds to its borrower, who then in turn uses the funds to further its
53. See Carter, 681 F.2d at 390.
54. Id. at 391.
55. Id. (citing Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979)).
56. Id. See also Jackson Rapid Delivery Serv. v. Jones Truck Lines, 641 F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D. Miss. 1986)
(enumerating the characteristics of a fiduciary duty arising in contractual relationships); First Bank v. Moden, 235 Kan.
260, 262, 681 P.2d 11, 13 (1984) (weakness of age, mental strength, business intelligence, knowledge of the facts
involved, or other conditions giving the lender an advantage over the borrower may indicate existence of a fiduciary
relationship).
57. See, e.g., Moden, 235 Kan. 260, 262, 681 P.2d 11, 13 ("Ordinarily, the relationship between a bank and its
customer is that of a creditor-debtor and not that of a fiduciary."). For a more detailed exposition of this view, see Ebke
& Griffin, supra note 1, at 795-98.
58. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511,209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985) (noted in Kitada, Emerging Theories of Bank Liabilitj-The
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 103 BANMG L.J. 80 (1986)).
59. Id. at 516, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
60. Id.
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own interests. Although this distinction would seem to be significant, the trend, at
least in California, is to impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing in all contractual
relationships. 6 1
C. Bad Faith and Unfair Dealing
Assuming that a special relationship exists between a lender and its borrower,
damages other than compensatory damages are not available in all cases. Punitive
damages may be awarded only for acts or omissions resulting from bad faith and
unfair dealing.62 Yet, not every breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
constitutes bad faith and unfair dealing. At a minimum, a finding of bad faith requires
conduct by the lender which is clearly arbitrary, malicious, or capricious. 63 Some
courts have ruled, however, that in order to obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct with knowledge that
the conduct presented a substantial risk of harm to another. 64 One court held that
punitive damages "are recoverable in bad faith tort actions, when, and only when, the
facts establish that defendant's conduct was aggravated, outrageous, malicious or
fraudulent." ' 65 In commercial lending transactions, such conduct would seem to be
the exception rather than the rule.
mH. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The foregoing discussion of some pertinent cases illustrates that the law of
lender liability is in flux. In addition to traditional contract and tort liability theories,
courts are developing novel theories to hold lenders liable to their debtors in cases
where there would have been no liability a few years ago. The theory of good faith
and fair dealing is probably the single most disturbing of all the lender liability
theories that are presently evolving.
In light of the nature of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, it is highly
questionable whether the emerging good faith doctrine is likely to promote more
desirable conduct on the part of lenders in commercial lending transactions. 66 The
obligation of good faith and fair dealing, by its very nature, provides no objectively
identifiable guidelines concerning the bounds of legally permissible conduct. The
obligation of good faith and fair dealing does no more than instruct the lender that "it
is right to do right." In commercial lending transactions, such a mandate is, without
further delineation, formless and inconsistent with the basic notion of fairness that
notice be given as to what activities are legally permitted or prohibited. 67 If the
61. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 354 (1984).
62. See generally Comment, Damages Measurementfor Bad Faith Breach ofContract: An Economic Analysis, 39
STAN. L. REv. 161 (1986).
63. See, e.g., Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 740 P.2d 631, 635 (Mont. 1987).
64. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149, 162, 726 P.2d 565, 578 (1986).
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. For a more detailed exposition of this view, see Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 798, 806-13.
67. For example, in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court stated that "a judicial
holding that certain undefined activities 'generally are prohibited' ... would raise questions whether either criminal or
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objective of the emerging theories of lender liability is to promote fairness and
certainty in commercial lending transactions, and the authors believe it is, the
actionable obligation of good faith and fair dealing is presently too broad and
amorphous to serve as a basis of lender liability, as no workable limits to liability
exist. Judicial interpretations thus far have not provided clear boundaries of
acceptable conduct. A case-by-case approach, while appropriate for a remedial
sanction such as an injunction, is not appropriate for the remedy of damages.
What is even more disturbing is the gradual erosion by the judiciary of the
distinction between the covenant and the duty of good faith and fair dealing. This
development opens the door for extraordinary exemplary damage awards, possibly
even in the absence of clearly arbitrary, malicious, or capricious conduct. Much has
been written on the question of whether the present tort law system with its com-
pensatory and exemplary damage awards effectively serves deterrence and prevention
purposes. 68 With respect to commercial lending transactions, the authors of this Article
have come to the conclusion that, in light of all available evidence, the evolving lender
liability theories in general and the increasing threat of liability for punitive damages
in particular add very little in terms of deterrence and prevention. 69 Yet, even if one
assumes that the emerging theory of good faith and fair dealing can be justified on the
ground that it prevents economic harm by deterring unreasonable conduct on the part
of commercial lenders, punitive damage awards for a lender's breach of the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing would seem to be improper where the conduct of the
lender is not clearly arbitrary, malicious, or capricious. This is so because the standards
of conduct in the commercial lending area remain relatively uncertain. 70
In this context, it should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has
agreed to consider whether punitive damage awards constitute excessive fines or
violate the due process mandates of the United States Constitution when juries have
no guidelines as to when punitive damages should be awarded and when no limits
exist as to the amount that may be assessed. 71 Although the case before the Court
does not involve any of the developing theories of lender liability, the decision may
have a stabilizing impact on this unsettled area of law. If the Court finds that punitive
damages, excessive or otherwise, violate the Constitution, lenders, it seems, would
have a strong case for the proposition that they should not be held liable for punitive
damages if they adhere to the terms of the lending agreements with their borrowers.
Civil liability of commercial lenders to their borrowers, it has been said, is part
civil defendants would be given fair notice that they have engaged in illegal activity." Id. at 235 n.20 (emphasis added).
While Chiarella involved an alleged criminal violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Supreme
Court expressly referred to civil defendants. Id.
68. For excellent theoretical analyses of this question, see Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv.
1193 (1984), and Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAiF. L. REv. 555 (1985).
69. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 811.
70. Accord Case Comment, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co., 69 MiNN. L. REv. 1161, 1187-89, 1197-98 (1985) (punitive damage awards improper in commercial
setting when standards of conduct uncertain).
71. Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W.
3394 (1988). See also Supreme Court Shows Interest in Debate on Limiting Damage Awards in Civil Suits, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 5, 1988, at 27, col. 6.
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of a net of control devices that the legal system has developed in order to strengthen
the integrity of the banking system for the benefit of both individuals and the public. 72
Assuming that this observation is correct, for the sake of the balance of the system
when taken as a whole, none of the control devices should be overemphasized at the
expense of the others. The trend today, no doubt, is clearly toward an expansion of
civil liabilities of lenders rather than the utilization of other measures of control. The
evolving liability theory of good faith and fair dealing epitomizes this development.
Legal theories of lender liability are emerging so rapidly that lawyers do not have time
to react; instead, lawyers in their respective capacities as judges, legislators, attorneys,
administrators, and academicians must now exercise analytical ingenuity and engage
in creative imagination to be able to cope with the problem of how the position of
lenders vis-a-vis debtors can be preserved without violations of the debtors' interests.
In this regard, the enormous transactional costs that are associated with the
expansion of civil liabilities of commercial lenders deserve special attention. 73 These
costs are particularly high with respect to the evolving liability theory of good faith
and fair dealing as, under this theory, the number of fact questions to be resolved
between opposing parties will be increased. 74 The result, of course, is an increase in
the cost of litigation as the possibility of summary judgment is reduced. The legal,
economic, and social effects of the increasing cost of litigating commercial lending
cases is a significant factor yet to be studied carefully. Some banking lawyers have
predicted that an expansion of the liability of lenders will result in defensive lending
practices. 75 It will be particularly interesting to see whether these predictions come
true.
Whether or not one views the emerging theory of lender liability for breach of
the obligation of good faith and fair dealing as beneficial, it should be remembered
that an overexpansion of lender liability theories, irrespective of how noble the
judiciary's motives may be, is more likely to upset the present balance between the
adverse interests of lenders and borrowers than attempts to proceed cautiously toward
a rational body of principles and rules of lender liability. 76 In their endeavor to shape
lender liability law, courts should closely coordinate existing and emerging liability
theories so as to create a body of coherent principles and rules that give commercial
lenders fair notice that certain activities are unacceptable, regardless of express terms
of contract, and may result in liability for damages. Those rules should provide
courts, attorneys, borrowers, lenders, and all concerned with adequate guidance as to
whether and how a lender's conduct resulting in economic harm to a debtor can be
remedied. In any event, borrowers, lenders, and society will be decidedly better off
if the boundaries of the lender liability theories generally and the doctrine of good
faith and fair dealing specifically are not unreasonably or unwisely expanded.
72. Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 806.
73. For details, see Ebke & Griffin, supra note I, at 811-13. See also Note, The Growth of Lender Liability: An
Economic Perspective, 21 GA. L. Rav. 723 (1987).
74. See supra text accompanying note 53.
75. See Bailey, Banks Hit by Borrowers' Liability Suits, Wall St. J., June 2, 1988, at 25, col. 3.
76. For a more detailed exposition of this view, see Ebke & Griffin, supra note 1, at 800-17.
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